Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 7

1940

TRUSTS-RIGHT OF DIVORCED WIFE OF BENEFICIARY OF
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST TO REACH THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST
IN THE TRUST FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN
W. Wallace Kent
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
W. W. Kent, TRUSTS-RIGHT OF DIVORCED WIFE OF BENEFICIARY OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUST TO REACH
THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST IN THE TRUST FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1123 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss7/27

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

u23

TRUSTS- RIGHT OF DIVORCED WIFE OF BENEFICIARY OF SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST TO REACH THE BENEFICIARv's INTEREST IN THE TRUST FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN P, divorced wife of D, brought this
action for alimony and for support money for her children. The object of the
action was to reach the income from a spendthrift trust created for the benefit
of D and his present wife and children in the will of D's mother. The will
specifically provided that none of the proceeds of the trust were to go to P or
her child. Held, the settlor had the right to devise her property in any manner
she chose. There is nothing in the statutes or decisions of Wisconsin which forbid
such terms in a trust. Nor is there any public policy which would prevent such.
Bill dismissed. There was a strong dissent on the grounds that Wisconsin had not
declared its policy on this question and that untJ1 such was done this court could
decide as it thought just. Schwager 'lJ, Schwager, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109

F. (2d) 754.
This question as to the right of the beneficiary's wife and children to share
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in the income from a spendthrift trust is in great conflict.1 Some courts allow
recovery on the ground that the settlor would have intended to care for the dependents of the beneficiary.2 Most courts will try to reach such a decision, but
this was impossible in the principal case.8 The Restatement of Trusts lays down
the rule that public policy requires that the dependents of a beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust be supported from the beneficiary's interest in the trust 4 and
there is authority for this rule.5 The principal case is the second recent case
which discusses the rule laid down by the Restatement and then, in a carefully
considered opinion, refuses to follow it. 6 There is also a third recent case which
reaches a conclusion contrary to the Restatement but without discussing the
rule as laid down therein.7 In the light of the consideration given the public
policy in these recent cases, there seems to be an indication of a trend away fro~
the rule suggested by the Restatement of Trusts. This trend is apparently based
on the theory that the settlor has the right to dispose of his property as he sees
fit and that it is not the function of the courts to interfere with such disposal.8
W. Wallace Kent
1 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 157.1 (1939); GRiswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, §§
333-336, 339 (1936); Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N. W. 161, 267
N. W. 426 (1936); In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802, 52 A. L. R.
1251 at 1259 (1927); Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N. W. 715 (1910).
2 Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 216, 132 A. IO (1926); Matter of Sand v. Beach,
270 N. Y. 281, 200 N. E. 821 (1936); Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369, 15 N. E.
783 ( 1888); Slattei:y v. Wason, l 51 Mass. 266, 23 N. E. 843 ( l 890); l ScoTT,
TRUSTS, § 157.1, note 4 (1939).
3 " • • • not, however, including his first wife or any of his children by her
[referring to persons for whose benefit the trust was created]." 109 F. (2d) 754 at 756.
4 l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§ 157 (1935).
5 In re Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802 (1927); England v.
England, 223 Ill. App: 549 (1922); Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 Ill. App. 552 (1929).
See also GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 334 (1936); l ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 157.1,
note 5 (1939).
6 The other case is Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N. W. 161, 267
N. W. 426 (1936).
7 Bucknam v. Bucknam, (Mass. 1936) 200 N. E. 918; Burrage v. Bucknam,
(Mass. 1938) 16 N. E. (2d) 705. See also, San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis,
121 Cal. App. 675, IO P. (2d) 158 (1932), where the court held that the settlor
was under no obligation to support the son (beneficiai:y)'s wife.
8 "• • • a testator has the right to dispose of his property in such manner as his
judgment may dictate." Principal case, 109 F. (2d) 754 at 759. "Her [testatrix']
command to pay the income to her son is direct and unequivocal." Burrage v. Bucknam,
(Mass. 1938) 16 N. E. (2d) 705 at 707. "Why a parent, or one who loves another,
and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as
property can do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own
improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is
not readily perFeived." Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71 at 75, 266 N. W. 161,
267 N. W. 426 (1936).
The principal case is also noted in 53 HAR.v. L. REV. 1059 (1940); and 88
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 758 (1940).

